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2003-2004 excavation at the Danielson site, Worcester MA. Yuccacentric
wockerjabby
Changed Priorities Ahead
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5.9.03 I'm heading out to the geography department Field Camp for the weekend. Blogging should resume Sunday night or Monday.
Kevin Drum's recent post on the gender gap in higher education -- more women than men are going to college, and women outperform men academically -- has spawned a long comments thread. The general consensus seems to be that there's a cultural (rather than structural or biological) factor at work here.
This assessment of the situation is probably true in the near term. It resembles a pessimistic take I had on gay marriage. But I would hope that, like Ampersand's friends who see marriage as devalued because of the exclusion of gays, men's attitudes toward doing "women's work" will change. I know that I, for one, would see a job as less attractive if there were an unjustified dominance of men in it (less so for an unjustified dominance of women, since then my presence would be helping to change things). Then again, maybe I just have a feminine attitude toward work and school -- after all, I spent much more time in college studying than I did drinking and playing video games, whatever some joker at the Maroon-News office thought. Stentor Danielson, 12:04, 4.9.03 My comments should hopefully be functional by Monday evening:
Stentor Danielson, 22:52,
My first cartoon of the year is online (no column from this week's issue). I'm going to try posting the cartoon itself here on the blog.
Henry Farrell posts about science fiction writers' attempts to grapple with economics in a future where there is no scarcity.
This is in a sense a follow-up to his earlier post about transhumanism. Both deal with the problem of how the human mind (economists are, presumably, human -- though the question of how ordinary people will experience a world without scarcity is even more interesting, from my point of view), a tool adapted to decision-making under constraints, deals with unconstrained scenarios. We don't have the same squicky reaction to a lack of economic scarcity as we do to transhumanism, perhaps because economic scarcity is less personal and more routinely frustrating. Indeed, there's a strong tradition on the left of celebrating the coming scarcity-free future. Or rather, there are two such traditions -- the Marxist, which says that industrial capitalism will end scarcity by producing so much so cheaply (a view shared by plenty on the right as well); and what I would call the eco-Daoist, which calls for a cultural change so that we are satisfied with what we have, thus experiencing abundance in a world that has reduced the actual availability of goods in order to live within its ecological means. It's interesting how many readers -- including myself -- immediately denied Henry's premise, asserting different ways in which scarcity would persist even in the presence of unlimited free material goods. One of the big factors is that, beyond bare subsistence needs, abundance is always defined relationally. A recent study (I can't find the link to it anymore) found that being rich doesn't make you happy, but being richer (than your neighbors, or than you were in the past) can. Everyone thinks that if they just had a little more -- twice their current income, according to the study -- they would beat scarcity, and have functional abundance. We create scarcity even where it doesn't have to exist. Thus it seems that only functionally infinite availability would count as total abundance. In that case, I wonder if the abundant goods wouldn't lose meaning. They would no longer be experienced as abundant or scarce, but as pointless, just as, say, people who live in a non-polluted area don't see air as any kind of issue at all. Stentor Danielson, 14:39, 3.9.03
Complaints about nonexistent red tape seem to be a popular tactic in the Bush administration -- they also feature prominently in the rationale for the Healthy Forests Initiative. It's a tricky strategy, and nearly fooled me here -- until I got toward the end of the article and saw that the red tape wasn't a real problem, I was willing to give this policy change the benefit of the doubt. I was still suspicious, though, because of the secrecy involved in this change. Ordinarily it would suggest that the administration has something it wants to hide, and expected a public comment period and publicity for the proposal would not bring accolades. On the other hand, this administration seems to have a genetic demand for secrecy, so it could perhaps be due as much to habit as to a rational calculation of the consequences in this particular case. I think there's something of a connection between the two elements of secrecy and aversion to red tape. In Max Weber's terminology of bureaucratic versus charismatic governance, Bush comes down squarely on the side of charisma. It was apparent in the 2000 campaign, when his supporters favorably contrasted his "character" to Al Gore's obsession with policy detail. It paid off handsomely when, after September 11, he was able to connect with Americans as a strong but comforting father figure rather than winning them over with a rational and effective plan for combatting terrorism (though many would argue that he did subsequently come up with that, too). He was famously able to judge Vladimir Putin's soul by a fact-to-face meeting with the Russian president, rather than an analysis of his acts in office. Beyond his personal charisma, Bush has a personality-based, rather than institutionalized, method of getting things done. It's well known that one of the things he prizes above all else in advisors is their personal loyalty. He wants to work through connections, not formal procedures. This is (at least part of) why he has such aversion to red tape, of which public disclosure/freedom of information requirements are a subset. "Red tape" is a pejorative (sometimes accurately so) term for institutional constraints on the actions of the powerful. Such restraints exist because the personal integrity of our leadership can't always be trusted -- at the most basic level, this is the "liberal" in "liberal democracy". Bush is frustrated by these formalities. He would restrain the abuses of the powerful not by explicit procedures but by a shared implicit morality. It's the obvious rawness of the formal standards, their existence as external constraints rather than internal motivations, that is the problem. This, I think, is the center of the difference between the small-government tendencies of social conservatism and of libertarianism. Various social theorists, notably Louis Althusser and Anthony Giddens (who nevertheless disagreed about much else), tended to divide social forces into three camps -- politics, economics, and ideology. Politics are those forces that revolve around physical coercion, or the threat thereof. Economics are those forces that arise out of incentives arising from access to resources. Ideology (intended here in a non-pejorative sense) is those forces that are rooted in people's beliefs. As a quick example, if you want to keep me off of your property, a political solution might be to hire a guard, an economic solution might be to pay me to keep out, and an ideological solution might be to convince me that God doesn't want me to tresspass. Both libertarians and conservatives have a distrust of the domestic use of political forces (since even the most seemingly benign regulations are backed by the threat of a court imposing a coercive punishment). But without political force, what keeps society in line? Libertarians place great confidence in economic forces -- that social order will arise spontaneously out of people's pursuit of scarce resources, so long as political force on the part of citizens or the government is kept at a minimum. There's a quasi-Darwinian logic in that anyone who strays too far will fail, like an out-competed company, and thus we're in a sense coerced by the threat of poverty into playing by the rules (a consequentialist system, as opposed to the short-term moralizing inherent in political justice). For this reason, libertarians are able to be "civil libertarians" -- that is, to grant broad freedom in matters of ideology such as freedom of speech or religion. Conservatives, on the other hand, place more confidence in ideology. Ideology acts as a sort of internalized coercion that keeps people wanting to be on the straight and narrow. When ideology is supreme, politics becomes unneccessary -- and thus conservatives are happy with rolling back those political regulations that they feel are superseded by people's ideological trustworthiness (as, for example, the trustworthiness of ordinary people to take care of their environments). In the short term, however, they often depend on an application of politics -- such as state-sponsored religion and moralizing legislation -- to cultivate the necessary ideology. Stentor Danielson, 11:53, 2.9.03
This article gives a nice synopsis of the way Bush's Healthy Forests Initiative serves the needs of the logging industry under the guise of serving the needs of the environment and communities vulnerable to fire. It closes with the nice paragraph above reminding us that often (though not always) the people directly engaged with the environment understand how to care for it, even if they can't do the right thing because of larger political and economic structures. The article also raises the point that current logging practices are not sustainable. This is bad not just for the environment and the loggers, but by extension the logging companies as well -- which raises the question of why they would push for something that enables them to ruin themselves. One possibility is simple shortsightedness. I don't think that's the whole story, since the loggers at least seem to see the long term, so you'd think it would have occurred to the higher-ups as well (one of the advantages of old-fashioned vertical promotion, instead of the increasingly popular horizontal movement between similar jobs at different companies, is that management would always have the experience and perspective of one of the grunts). And it would be in the company's best interest to take such a perspective -- if company A carefully husbands its resources, it can blow companies B and C out of the water once they waste all their resources on unsustainable practices. The counter to that is that perhaps companies B and C would run company A out of business through their unsustainable practices, so that it wouldn't last long enough to reap the rewards of its stewardship. This is a sort of "ruthless cutthroat logic of capitalism" argument. I'm not so sure that this is the whole story either. It seems that in this case it would be in any company's interest to have environmental standards in place across the board that would restrain both themselves, and their competitors, from being unsustainably ruthless. This kind of thing seems quite possible in the US (though not in some other country where you'd always have to worry about your competitor getting a special deal from their cronies in the government), especially if the timber companies have some sort of industry council that they can work collectively through. I think an element in the question is the nature of the timber company versus environmentalists debate. Just as environmentalists get tricked into seeing loggers as the enemy even when they're not, timber companies and those who try to support them can get tricked into being more anti-environmentalist than pro-logging. They start to assume that whatever the environmentalists want must be bad for logging. This kind of thinking works fine in most political issues, when the two sides want directly opposing things (e.g. no access to abortions versus lots of access to abortions). Environmentalists* oppose not logging (or any other industry environmentalists oppose) per se, but a side effect of logging. But so long as the two sides are seen as head-to-head, neither is able to see the insights the other has to offer about pursuing their goals together. Moreover, they begin to do things more to strike a blow at the enemy than to advance their real interests. I think the ethos of "those environmentalists can't tell us where we can and can't log/drill/mine" is sometimes as important in shaping environmentally destructive practice, particularly legislatively, as is rational economic calculation. Sustainable forestry comes off as capituation to environmentalism rather than a practice that's good for both the timber industry and the environment. *An important thing to note about the environmentalists in my post and the original article is that they're of the pragmatic anthropocentric-conservationist bent, which makes up the bulk of environmentalists. Hardcore biocentrists and ecocentrists would be less able to make the kinds of reconciliation at issue here. Stentor Danielson, 21:43, Uzbek workers have gone on strike, demanding the crazy socialist policy of actually paying people their wages. The authorities squashed it, but the fact that the strike even happens suggests that Uzbeks are fed up with what has been essentially thirteen more years of Soviet-style rule. I suppose it's too much to hope that the US puts some pressure on Islam Karimov to pay attention to the message from his people.
It's depressing that it's come to this, and I'm suspicious of turning to yet more massive engineering projects to fix a problem that was caused by massive engineering projects (Soviet irrigation schemes) and allowed to continue by the hope of yet more massive engineering projects (the SibAral Canal, that would have diverted part of the Ob river into Central Asia and thus supposedly fix everything). But perhaps a smaller, more manageable project like saving the northern half of the sea (i.e., the stuff that happens after the dam is done) will help lay the groundwork for reviving the whole thing. The consequences of the pollution and salt on the dry bed of the sea suggest that the only real long-term solution is to restore the entire sea to near-pre-Soviet levels. Stentor Danielson, 17:54,
One of the elements that made the Northeast blackout a few weeks back so catastrophic was the widespread interconnection of modern life. A transmission problem in Cleveland brought down not just that city's power, but power across the region. And without power, other services -- transportation, water, food provision, etc. -- broke down as well. Thus one of the suggestions proposed later was a greater decentralization of the power supply. This same interconnection is at the heart of many fears about terrorism. While the blackout was, of course, not due to terrorism, it's far from inconceivable that a terrorist could execute a similar attack on some element of the nation's (or world's) infrastructure, sending problems cascading through the system with just a small disruption. This interconnection thus is part of the increasing power that even an individual may be able to wield. Whereas a hunter-gatherer of a few thousand years ago would have been hard-pressed to kill even a handful of people, and could do little lasting damage to social systems, a modern-day terrorist could change the fate of the world. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's awful novel Vril: The Power Of The Coming Race predicted that, when everyone had infinite power, a truce of peace would result. Instead, today we fear being held hostage by a few extremists with great power. With Fox News' lawsuit against Al Franken dead, the "fair and balanced" frenzy has died down. Meanwhile, I'm becoming annoyed by the presence of signs for yard sales that are taped to poles around Worcester. They all say "yard sale today," yet they've been there for upwards of a week. So either some people are having a very long yard sale, or they couldn't be bothered to either a) write an actual date on their sign, or b) take their sign down once the sale was over. So, it's off to the kiosk for people who don't take their yard sale signs down.
1.9.03 Hopefully my comments will be back soon.
Matthew Yglesias makes a more philosophical version of the "my opponents live in a fantasy world that reinforces their own preconceptions" argument:
Though I haven't read "Will To Believe" (though I've read about it, and read other pragmatist literature including James' Pragmatism and Varieties of Religious Experience), I think the idea of Bushian* conceptions of Iraq illustrate the failures of vulgar pragmatism as compared to full-fledged pragmatism. Vulgar pragmatism concerns the psychological utility of a belief -- a belief is justified if you want to believe it, or if it makes you happy to believe it. Full-fledged pragmatism, on the other hand, concerns the practical utility of a belief -- a belief is justified if it enables you to successfully interact with the world around you. There is a psychological element to full-fledged pragmatism, of course -- a belief isn't very useful if it's too complicated to understand, for example. But psychology is not the only element, whereas it is in vulgar pragmatism. By the prevailing liberal take on the situation in Iraq (I'm hedging because I'm still not up to speed on the situation after my summer quasi-hiatus, so I'm relying on the judgement of bloggers I trust), the Bush administration has been engaging in some vulgar pragmatism. They want to believe that Saddam was a grave threat to the world, that Iraqis want to be liberated by American soldiers, that the reconstruction of Iraq is proceeding successfully, and so forth. So they selectively use information, trust exiles who tell them what they want to hear, ignore or hand-wave setbacks, and so forth. They alter their assessment of reality to the one most congenial to their (short-term) psychological satisfaction. However, one of the key points made by full-fledged pragmatists is that if your beliefs get too far out of whack, reality will bite you in the rear (a sort of optimistically Darwinian idea of truth, in which holders of erroneous beliefs are weeded out by their failure to act successfully within the world). And that seems to be happening in Iraq -- the problems of the Bushian belief have led the administration to fail to accomplish its stated goals in Iraq. For example, the belief that Iraqis would welcome America with open arms led them to neglect planning for the postwar phase, and to alienate allies who could provide much-needed resources for the reconstruction. Soldiers in Iraq with Bushian views must be finding it harder and harder to maintain them as those views prove themselves not to be conducive to successful action within the Iraqi environment. But the original pragmatists underestimated the human capacity for convincing oneself that one hasn't been bitten by reality. This is especially true for the administration's leaders, who are sheltered from reality's bite by their distance from the battlefield. (This point was essentially the point of my undergrad senior thesis on the failure of Soviet agriculture. In hindsight, my thesis was basically an attempt to create pragmatism and structuration theory from scratch, since I hadn't yet encountered John Dewey or Anthony Giddens.) What's more likely to bite Bush is the domestic political failure of his beliefs. He can fool himself about how well his views have allowed him to rebuild Iraq, but it's much harder to pretend that they enabled him to win reelection if the failure of his Iraq policy turns voters against him. *Or would it more properly be "Bushist"? This is like the "Marxist" vs. "Marxian" distinction that I've never been able to make head or tails of -- at best it seems some of Marx's followers prefer "-ian" because "-ist" suggests a quasi-religious rigid ideology. Stentor Danielson, 12:24, 31.8.03
Stentor Danielson, 16:50, |
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