2.6.05

Ampersand Saves Me The Trouble Of Being Interviewed

Ampersand recently did an interview with the right-wing blog Conservative Christian. He currently has me listed on his blogroll as being to his right, so I was a bit surprised that I agreed with nearly everything he said*. The only real disagreements, I think, are that I would prioritize environmental issues more than he does, and that I take a stronger line on freedom of speech -- neither of which, I think, really place me to his right. The discussions of abortion and Terri Schiavo are tangential to my views, since I refuse to hold a position on either of those issues. But otherwise the interview is a good summary of the type of liberalism I subscribe to.

*Note that I'm not trying to dispute Amp's classification of me -- it's quite possible the interview just didn't delve into our areas of real disagreement. And it would be reasonable if, say, he had decided that abortion is just such a crucial issue that he can't consider anyone a fellow traveler if they're willing to give an inch to the pro-life side.
Stentor Danielson, 09:47, ,

Relational Models For Taxation

I apologize if you're not too interested in the relational models theory, but having just finished Fiske's book, it's on my mind.

One shortcoming of the relational models theory, as well as Cultural Theory, is that in focusing on the conflicts between models/worldviews, they don't offer much help in deciphering sub-model/worldview conflict. So Douglas and Wildavsky dwell on the contrast between the egalitarian Amish and the hierarchical Hutterities, but they don't have much to say on the differences between the Amish and the equally egalitarian Old Order Mennonites, or between the hierarchies of the EPA and the DoD. Fiske does go on at length about the importance of specifying the parameters for implementing a model, but he doesn't offer a theory about how particular parameters are chosen and what happens when people disagree about them.

I think taxation provides a nice example of the importance of parameters. In the modern US, the debate over taxes is, for all its acrimony, largely limited to Market Pricing visions of taxation. Certainly all four models offer a view of taxation. Communal Sharing would lead to a voluntary contribution system. Under the Articles of Confederation, we found that the Communal Sharing ethos isn't strong enough in modern states to support this type of system. Authority Ranking suggests a feudal or imperial tribute system, which has been out of favor for centuries. Equality Matching would undergird a system in which each person is charged the same dollar amount. We do see this system at work in many places today -- for example, toll roads and vehicle registration fees, which cost the same amount for the pauper and the billionaire. But outside of New Hampshire, few governments get a major portion of their revenue from this type of head tax.

One of the big arguments in modern tax policy is between two versions of Market Pricing. (It may seem odd to describe taxation as "Market Pricing," but the Market Pricing model is a broad concept covering any system based on equity, proportionality, and ratios.) Both flat-taxers and progressive-taxers agree that taxes should be proportional to wealth, but they disagree as to how to measure that wealth. To flat taxers, taxation should be proportional to dollar value. Everyone should pay the same number of cents per dollar to the government. This philosophy underlies both a flat income tax and a sales tax. Progressive taxers believe that taxation should be proportional to utility, that is, the amount of happiness that wealth brings. As the early utilitarians noted, there is a general trend of diminishing marginal utility with increases in wealth -- each additional dollar is worth less. Thus a properly equitable system would charge rich people a higher number of cents per dollar. While this philosophy is best associated with a progressive income tax, it is also crudely approximated by some sales taxes that exempt necessities like food and clothes (which make up a larger proportion of the poor's budgets) from taxation and which add a luxury tax to items that rich people buy more of. The key point here is that both progressive taxers and flat taxers believe that their system is properly proportional, the commonsense application of the Market Pricing idea -- and thus the other system is inequitable and thus a backhanded form of Authority Ranking.

Likewise, our most salient tax question -- what the rate of taxation will be within a given structure -- is also a question of parameter specification. Here, I think the taxation parameter is subordinated as a means to supporting a choice of models elsewhere in society. Libertarians thus support low taxes because they're instrumental toward maintaining a wider Market Pricing system running on neoclassical economic parameters. Small government conservatives also support low taxes, but they do so because they favor Communal Sharing at the local community level. Liberals likewise want to support Communal Sharing, but because they specify the parameters of the community as being the whole nation, they are led to favor a high tax rate.
Stentor Danielson, 09:07, ,

31.5.05

Two Kinds Of Commons

Below I commented that Communal Sharing would negate itself if one of my housemates took advantage of the access Communal Sharing granted them in order to hoard all of the cookies for themself. This suggested a refinement of our thinking about common property systems.

The social science literature on the commons was sparked by Garrett Hardin's classic article, arguing that common property inevitably leads to a tragedy as individually rational action leads individuals to overuse the commons. The bulk of social science reaction to Hardin's article, led by Elinor Ostrom, was based on the argument that the commons as Hardin describes it is not an accurate depiction of common property systems around the world. In most common property systems, some form of social organization -- most often Equality Matching, in which all participants are expected to make equal contributions to maintenance and are allocated equal shares of the produce or given an equal turn at using it -- explicitly limits exploitation. These authors concede that in the case of what is referred to as an "open access resource," such as oil, the Tragedy of the "Commons" plays out much like Hardin describes.

In discussing the Communal Sharing model, Fiske repeatedly asserts that common property falls under this model. And in fact his ethnographic descriptions of Communal Sharing among the Moose do resemble Hardin's open access rather than Ostrom's Equality Matching commons. No quotas are set on people's use of land or water, they are simply given free to anyone who asks. So why don't the Moose succumb to a Tragedy of the Commons?

I would suggest that there are actually two models of non-Tragic commons: the Ostromian and the Lockean. The latter gets its name because its features are suggested by Locke's account of property. Locke argues that appropriation of resources is initially limited by the inability to use more than a certain amount. There's no point in taking more apples than you can eat before they go bad. Locke says that this system will and should be superseded by the development of non-perishable, hoardable stores of value (namely money). With the ability to turn them into money, people can appropriate an unlimited amount of resources.

Among the Moose and other groups that use this system, the Lockean commons is spared from this monetary Tragedy by the very Communal Sharing ideas that underly the open access rule system. In a Communal Sharing situation, the boundaries between self and other are blurred. I do not think of you as another person with whom I must compete for resources, but as a fellow part of the larger group. So it makes no sense to hoard resources for the future use of my self -- and thus no rules limiting exploitation are needed. Each of us can take as much as we need, and the limits of our ability to use resources at once will (hopefully) be sufficient to keep the resource from being overexploited.

What the Tragedy of the Commons exhibits, then, is a dysfunctional system resulting from a mismatch between people's orientations (Market Pricing) and the social rules they encounter (Communal Sharing). But contra Hardin, the Market Pricing orientation is not universal.
Stentor Danielson, 15:24, ,

Social Theory Of Cookies

I just noticed a bit of anecdotal confirmation of a bit of Alan Fiske's work on relational models in my own life -- specifically, in my handling of cookies.

Fiske's theory is that there are four basic models of social interaction. Different societies mix and match them differently, implementing them in different domains with different parameters, but the underlying structures, motives, and ethical principles are the same. The four models are:

• Communal Sharing: All members of an "in" group are considered equivalent -- so much so that the lines between individual selves are blurred. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" is the guiding maxim.


• Authority Ranking: People are ordinally ranked, with those higer up able to command obedience and to offer noblesse oblige on their own terms. Those lower down gratefully accept their superiors' paternalism.


• Equality Matching: Balanced reciprocity rules, with qualitatively equal goods or services exchanged. Everyone gets an equal share regardless of need, want, or power. Equal division of a pool, "one man, one vote" systems, or turn-taking are all examples.


• Market Pricing: Exchange ratios (often recorded in a universal medium such as money) allow trading off of qualitatively different goods or services, and bargaining for the best deal is pursued.

Kiosk Update

I haven't updated the Kiosk in a very long time, but while listening to the otherwise enjoyable Camper van Beethoven song "Take the Skinheads Bowling," I was reminded of another thing that annoys me: song lyrics that comment on their own lack of rhyme. I'm fine with song lyrics that don't rhyme. But "There's not a line that goes here that rhymes with anything" is not acceptable. So, to the Kiosk with you!
Stentor Danielson, 10:55, ,

29.5.05

Editing The Past

Hugo Schwyzer is one of my favorite bloggers because he continues to falsify any theory I try to construct about what makes him tick. He manages to simultaneously bare his soul and keep his personal life a jealously guarded secret. He recently posted about the pitfalls of LiveJournal-style blogging, posting all the gory details of your day-to-day life. He's concerned that some of his youth group kids are being insufficiently cautious about what they post. I quite agree in terms of the need to remember who has access to what you write (though the use of friends filters and the brouhaha over "frienditto" a few months back suggest that most LJers are already thinking hard about these issues). Most of my life never shows up here or on my LJ, and I'm happy with that level of privacy.

But then Schwyzer offers another rationale for being more private that I'm not so keen on: "By documenting so many details of their intimate lives, many are losing the opportunity to start over, to change, to redefine themselves in the eyes of their peers, parents, and everyone else." I understand the need to be able to change, both internally and in the eyes of others. That change is easier when information about your past is not readily available. People have an understandable skepticism about claims to have changed, and are quite willing to use details of the past against each other.

On the other hand, I don't think that such documentation of the past is a bar to change. One need not (in some cases cannot) use the "born again" model, in which the past is wiped out or treated as if it belonged to a separate person. There is a role for being honest about what you have done and how you interpret it as part of the history of the person you are today. Having the "raw data" available can put a check on wishful thinking or rationalization about where you came from.

While I've never blogged (or even privately journaled) about the kinds of sex, drugs, etc. issues that Schwyzer is concerned about, but political opinions can be rather personal. I'm concerned about people -- including myself -- thinking that I'm a good writer with intelligent things to say. As I was building my personal website, I had the opportunity to edit my own past, picking and choosing what elements of my past writing were made available. I'll admit that I had a strong impulse to censor it, to decline to put up anything from my embarassing first couple years of political writing. Even now I cringe at the thought of people following the link and reading some of the things I wrote years ago. But I also felt that I would be a bit dishonest with myself if I did that. I don't want to be thought of as the kind of person who writes "Colgate's E-Mail Wars Could Teach NATO A Thing Or Two", but I'll accomplish that by putting it in the context of my development as a writer and thinker.

So be aware of what happens when you hit "post," but don't assume you must err on the side of privacy.
Stentor Danielson, 16:24, ,